

We have attempted to show that the Galilean-Cartesian myth signals nothing else, on a certain level of analysis, than the emergence, in historical reality, of a possible discourse on production. This is one of the meanings of the theory of the body-machine which, as it confiscates the body's finality, develops the possibility of conceptualizing the productive body. At the other end of this chain, once the ruse that Cartesianism brings to light (without being its ultimate producer) is actualized, the discipline of psychology is nothing other, taken as a whole and in its multiple forms, than the discourse of production which is now economically necessary and historically possible: this is the reality of psychology. Or, if one prefers, through psychological discourses and practices (concerning aptitudes and learning, as well as mental pathology and personality), it is the productive body itself that speaks and acts, that discretely or spectacularly distills words and ideas—not without apparent contradictions—

which promote, recuperate, or sanitize, as they still do today on various levels and through a conspicuous politics, our active ideology, our vulgar economy, and our traditional or experimental pedagogy, etc. The productive body whispers, and these whispers radiate throughout all the sectors of everyday life; psychology is *one* of the real discourses of mastery over the productive body. The subject of psychology is therefore the productive body itself insofar as the biological body, the fundamental element of the productive body, requires a specific discourse through which, in a certain manner and with a certain tone, the entirety of the productive body expresses itself. At the same time, the intervention of the psychologist is marked by an immense ambiguity: in spite of and because of its premises, psychology is constituted as the most extreme effort to mechanize living beings, and as the necessary recognition of the failure of the total mechanization of life. The psychologist did not invent the living machine; but because this machine is *also* a living thing, the finality of the discipline is forced, in the end, to fall back on multiple conceptual and analogical supports imposed by the importation of a biological model into the heart of psychology itself. The “natural” problem of survival becomes a problem about the living being within the productive body, a two-fold problem in fact: there is individual consumption and there is productive consumption, and psychology takes charge of one aspect of the second category. The goals of psychology, which are no doubt distinct from those of the psychologist himself, are thereby integrated into the general goals of the productive body which, constrained as it is to tear life away from living beings in order to reduce them to desirable, machine-like acts, encounters at every step and in all its diverse forms the resistance of life—whether in class struggle, in the form of a resurgence of aspirations for living work, or, in everyday life, as demands for the recognition of alterity—and must, in consequence, and in the strongest sense, take account of it.